STRONG COMPOSITION DOWN. CHARACTERIZATIONS OF NEW AND CLASSICAL BANKRUPTCY RULES

This paper is devoted to the study of claims problems. We identify the family of rules that satisfy strong composition down (robustness with respect to reevaluations of the estate) and consistency (robustness with respect to changes in the set of agents) together. We call to that family the backbone family, which is a generalization of the weighted constrained equal awards rules. In addition, once strong composition down is combined with homogeneity only the weighted constrained equal awards rules survive. We also prove that the constrained equal awards rule is the unique rules satisfying strong composition down and equal treatment of equals together.strong composition down, backbone rules, constrained equal awards rule, weighted constrained equal awards rules

Drastic disorded-induced reduction of signal amplification in scale-free networks

Understanding information transmission across a network is a fundamental task for controlling and manipulating both biological and man-made information processing systems. Here, we show how topological resonant-like amplification effects in scale-free networks of signaling devices are drastically reduced when phase disorder in the external signals is considered. This is demonstrated theoretically by means of a star-like network of overdamped bistable systems, and confirmed numerically by simulations of scale-free networks of such systems. The taming effect of the phase disorder is found to be sensitive to the amplification's strength, while the topology-induced amplification mechanism is robust against this kind of quenched disorder in the sense that it does not significantly change the values of the coupling strength where amplification is maximum in its absence.Comment: 5 pages, 4 (double) figure

ALLOCATION PROBLEMS WITH INDIVISIBILITIES WHEN PREFERENCES ARE SINGLE-PEAKED

We consider allocation problems with indivisible goods when agents’ preferences are single-peaked. Two natural procedures (up methods and temporary satisfaction methods) are proposed to solve these problems. They are constructed by using priority methods on the cartesian product of agents and integer numbers, interpreted either as peaks or opposite peaks. Thus, two families of solutions arise this way. Our two families of solutions satisfy properties very much related to some well-known properties studied in the case of perfectly divisible goods, and they have a strong relationship with the continuous uniform and equal-distance rules, respectively.Allocation problem, indivisibilities, single-peaked preferences, temporary satisfaction method, up method.

EGALITARIAN RULES IN CLAIMS PROBLEMS WITH INDIVISIBLE GOODS

In this work we deal with rationing problems. In particular with claims problems with indivisible goods, that is, problems in which a certain amount of indivisible units (of an homogeneous good), has to be distributed among a group of agents, when this amount is not enough to satisfy agents' demands. We define discrete rules to solve those problems that involve notions of fairness similar to those supporting the constrained-equal awards and the constrained-equal losses rules in the continuous case. Axiomatic characterizations of those solutions are provided.indivisible goods, claims problems, equal awards solution, equal losses solution.

SUCCESS VERSUS DECISIVENESS: CONCEPTUAL DISCUSSION AND CASE STUDY

In this paper, we vindicate the relevance of the notion of success or satisfaction for the normative assessment of voting rules. We provide arguments in support of this view and emphasize the conceptual and analytical differences between this notion and that of decisiveness. The conclusions are illustrated in the case study provided by three different voting rules that have been proposed for the Council of Ministers of the European Union.Voting, European Union, Power indices

ON THE DIFFICULTY OF MAKING DECISIONS WITHIN THE EU-25

In this paper we measure the effect of the quota on the difficulty of making decisions in the EU-25 Council after the next enlargement. We compute the probability of a proposal being rejected in the Council. This probability depends on the voting rule (and therefore on the quota) and on the probabilities of the different vote configurations. Here we do not consider that all vote configurations are equiprobable, the classical implicit or explicit assumption. We assume that vote configurations with a minority of members states in favour of the proposal have a null probability, with other vote configurations being equiprobable.European Council, Decision making, Voting rules, European enlargement.

Improving the Measurement of Human Development

We propose a new Human Development Index that involves a number of changes with respect to the present one, even though it keeps the basic structure of the index (namely, preserving “health”, “education” and “material wellbeing” as the three basic dimensions of human development). The first change refers to the substitution of the arithmetic mean by the geometric mean, as a way of aggregating the different dimensions in a more sensible way. The second one leads to the introduction of distributive considerations in the evaluation of material wellbeing. The last change consists of the introduction of new variables to approach health and education, looking for a higher sensitivity of the index with respect to the differences between countries. These new variables are specially indicated for the analysis of human development in highly developed countries. Besides the conceptual discussion, that includes a characterization of the chosen aggregation formula, we present a comparative analysis of this new index and the standard one, focusing on the OECD countries.Human Development, multiplicative indices, distributive concerns, highly developed countries, HDI